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DOLAN V. TIGARD AND THE ROUGH
PROPORTIONALITY TEST: ROUGHLY SPEAKING,
WHY ISN'T A NEXUS ENOUGH?
CHRISTOPHER J. ST JEANOS*
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment... pro-
vides that it shall not be taken... without compensation. When
this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the
police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears.'
INTRODUCTION
A development exaction is a form of land-use regulation by which a
municipality conditions the granting of a development permit2 on the
landowner's return of something of value to the community. 3 Initially,
municipalities conditioned the grant of permits to develop upon the
agreement to build sidewalks and streets within the proposed develop-
ment.4 Towns soon realized the effectiveness of exactions as a land-
use tool and began to require developers to agree to off-site condi-
tions before granting permits to build.5 The use of the development
exaction eventually led to municipalities accomplishing public service
goals without the burden of paying for them.'
As might be expected, because development exactions restrict a
landowner's ability to develop land and often may result in demands
for title,7 they have generated a significant amount of litigation.8 De-
velopers claim that exactions force them to surrender their land with-
* I would like to thank Professor William Treanor for his assistance and encour-
agement in writing this Note.
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 405 (1922).
2. The Supreme Court held the use of the police power in the form of zoning,
including the issuance of permits, constitutional in 1926. Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
3. See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exac-
tions: From Dedication to Linkage, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1987, at 69, 70.
4. Id. at 70.
5. See id. (describing use of in-lieu fees to build parks and schools outside of the
subdivision).
6. 1d. at 71-72; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. C. 2309, 2313-15 (1994)
(describing Tigard's use of exaction scheme as method of acquiring land for greenway
and bicycle path); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827-29 (1987)
(describing commission's use of exaction scheme to acquire land across private prop-
erty for lateral easement connecting two public beaches).
7. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314 (explaining City of Tigard ordinance that re-
quired dedication of land to the city whenever a permit to develop was requested).
8. See John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions:
The Quest for a Rationale, 52 Cornell L.Q. 871, 873 (1967) (stating that it is not sur-
prising that landowners have vigorously challenged exaction schemes).
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out just compensation and thus violate their Fifth Amendment fights
as landowners.9 Landowners have even claimed that exaction
schemes are no more than "out and out plan[s] of extortion." 10
Claims concerning the constitutionality of development exactions
first reached the Supreme Court in 1987. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission," the Court adopted heightened scrutiny1 2 as the
proper standard of review to be applied in development exactions
cases. As part of that heightened scrutiny, the Court developed what
is essentially a two-pronged test to determine when an exaction quali-
fies as an invalid use of the police power thus requiring the govern-
ment to compensate the landowner for taking her property. Under
the first prong of the test, a court must determine whether the exac-
tion would withstand a takings analysis if it were enacted as an in-
dependent regulation.' 3 If it would not be a taking then the exaction
is a valid use of the police power and compensation is not required.14
If the regulation would be a taking if enacted independently, it may
still withstand a takings review when demanded in return for a devel-
opment permit. Under the second prong of the Nollan test, the mu-
nicipality must demonstrate an "essential nexus"' 5 between a harm
9. Id. The Fifth Amendment states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
10. J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981).
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Id. at 837.
The Court has used three standards of review in determining the constitutionality
of various legislative actions:
The lowest standard is rational basis. An appellate court reviewing a legislative act
under this standard will not second guess the decision if any rational basis can be
found for the particular statute. Black's Law Dictionary 1262 (6th ed. 1990).
The highest level of review is strict scrutiny. When using this standard of review a
court requires the government to prove: 1) that there be a compelling government
interest at stake that should take precedence over an individual right; 2) a close link
between the policy in question and protection of that compelling interest; and 3) there
is no less intrusive way the government can protect that compelling interest. Walter F.
Murphy et al., American Constitutional Interpretation 689 (1986).
Heightened scrutiny falls somewhere between these two standards. The exact level
of scrutiny required under this standard, however, is not constant and varies depend-
ing on the situation under review.
13. See Nollan 483 U.S. at 830-31 (explaining that had California simply required
the easement without attaching it to the request for a permit, it would have been a
taking). An independent regulation is one that is not attached to the request for a
permit to develop. By classifying and separating independent regulations from exac-
tions schemes, the Court is inferring that their treatment should differ. Id.
14. See id. at 834 ("We have long recognized that land-use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.'" (quoting
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
15. Id. at 837. In describing the rationale for the requirement of an "essential
nexus," the Nollan Court stated:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legiti-
mate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be
found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a
taking. We agree.... [T]he Commission's assumed power to forbid con-
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identified with the proposed development and the required exaction.' 6
Absent an "essential nexus," a development exaction is not a valid use
of the municipality's police power and requires compensation.' 7
Though it supplied the threshold test, the Nollan Court failed to
specify how closely an exaction and harm must be related to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.' 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Dolan v. City of Tigard9 to address this issue and clarify the level of
heightened scrutiny required.
Mrs. Dolan owns a 1.67 acre plot of land in the City of Tigard, on
which she operates a retail electric and plumbing supply store."0 Her
land borders Fanno Creek.2' Fanno Creek is the drainage system for
excess storm-water runoff from Tigard. Mrs. Dolan applied for a per-
mit to enlarge her store to approximately twice its previous size.2 She
also wished to increase the amount of paved parking on her prem-
ises3 Mrs. Dolan's proposed expansion met all applicable zoning re-
strictions.24 The City of Tigard, however, refused to issue a permit for
the expansion unless she yielded to two conditions: 1) she had to
dedicate that portion of her land that lies within the 100 year flood-
plain of Fanno Creek as a greenway to the city; and 2) she had to
dedicate a fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain for the
construction of a pedestrian and bicycle pathway.2S
These dedications were demanded pursuant to a local plan adopted
to meet the requirements of Oregon's land-use planning statutes.2 6
The plan required dedication of open land to, among other things,
facilitate the building of a pedestrian and bicycle pathway, and im-
prove the drainage capacity of Fanno Creek. 7 The case wound its
way through the Oregon legal system and the conditions imposed on
Mrs. Dolan were finally found constitutional by the Supreme Court of
struction of the house in order to protect the public[ ] ... must surely include
the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner
I& at 836.
16. Id. at 837.
17. Id
18. See id. The Nollan Court determined that heightened scrutiny is the proper
level of review in development exaction cases. The Court adopted the -nexus" test as
a threshold test to determine when an exaction will survive heightened scrutiny.
Under the specific facts of Nollan, however, even the lowest level of heightened scru-
tiny was not satisfied. Id at 838. The Court in Nollan did not explain, therefore, ex-
actly how "heightened" the scrutiny in development exactions must be.
19. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
20. Id at 2313.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at 2313-14.
24. Id at 2314.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id at 2313.
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Oregon.' Mrs. Dolan petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. In response to Mrs. Dolan's takings
challenge the Court created a standard termed the "rough proportion-
ality" test. 9 For a development exaction to withstand the scrutiny of
a reviewing court under the current standard, a municipality must
prove not only that an exaction has a "nexus" with a harm created by
the proposed development, but also that the exaction is "roughly pro-
portional" to that harm.30 As stated by the Supreme Court, the
"rough proportionality" test requires a municipality to "make some
sort of individualized determination that the [exaction] is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."'3 1
As a result of the Nollan and Dolan cases, a municipality must be
able to justify using its land-use power to demand exactions by show-
ing that the exaction required is related to a harm caused by the devel-
opment. The rationale for the relationships required, and the tests
employed by the Court as part of heightened scrutiny, can be repre-
sented in what may be termed a "mirror image" model. The model
consists of three parts representing the three requirements that an ex-
action must satisfy to be a valid exercise of the police power under the
current standard.
The first part of the model illustrates the truism that an image in a
mirror can only exist as the reflection of an object. By analogy, a le-
gitimate use of the police power (the reflection in the mirror) exists
only when a harm (the object creating the reflection) exists and must
be alleviated. If no identifiable harms related to development exist,
no basis for a legitimate use of the municipality's land-use powers ex-
ists either.3" This first part of the model is the easiest for municipali-
ties to satisfy because almost all development can be shown to create
at least one negative externality.33
The second part of the "mirror image" model posits that each re-
flection or image in a mirror is attached to the object it represents.
Therefore, once the object is removed, the reflection cannot remain in
the mirror. That is, the reflection cannot be created and then exist
independently of the object that created it. This part of the model is
representative of the second test in exaction cases, the required dem-
onstration of a "nexus." The "nexus" test requires a municipality to
show a connection between the use of the police power (the reflection
in the mirror) and the harm caused by development (the object in the
28. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
29. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
30. Id at 2319-20.
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
33. See Jesse Dukeminier & James Krier, Property 49-53 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining
that negative externalities are the negative effects of a person's actions when that
person makes a decision about how to use resources without taking full account of the
effects that decision will have on others).
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mirror), and prevents any exercise of the police power independent of
the recognized harm.'
The third part of the "mirror image" model reflects the notion that
an image in a mirror must necessarily be the same size as the object it
reflects.3 5 By analogy, when a state uses its police power to require an
exaction (or reflection in the mirror), that exaction must be propor-
tional to the harm (or object) that gives rise to its need. Neither of the
first two requirements placed on a municipality demanding an exac-
tion address this part of the model. Hence, some further test is re-
quired to scrutinize exactions and prevent demands for exactions that
are two, ten, or even fifty times greater than what is necessary to alle-
viate corresponding harms. This final requirement is met by the
"rough proportionality" test adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Dolan.
The "mirror image" model demonstrates how and why an exaction
must be related in three ways to some harm caused by the develop-
ment for the exaction to withstand constitutional scrutiny. While the
"mirror image" model is not meant to offer conclusive proof as to the
constitutional necessity of the "rough proportionality" test, it is help-
ful in demonstrating how exactions should be reviewed and limited by
the courts. The model also demonstrates that the concerns raised and
accepted as a basis for heightened scrutiny by courts and legal com-
mentators can only be adequately addressed if all three parts of the
model are followed.
The Dolan Court added an important new step to the method of
review that a court must use in development exactions cases. The
Court, however, failed to clarify the specific requirements of the
"rough proportionality" test or to explain the constitutional necessity
of it. This Note suggests answers to both of these questions and more
fully reviews the third part of the "mirror image" model. Part I ana-
lyzes relevant state court decisions and the Dolan decision to deter-
mine the exact requirements of the "rough proportionality" test. Part
II focuses on the necessity of heightened scrutiny in development ex-
action cases and demonstrates why a showing of a nexus is not enough
to guard against the dangers that development exactions pose. Part
I advances two additional arguments in favor of the "rough propor-
tionality" test. The part argues that a broad reading of the Takings
Clause requires exactions to be related to the harm of development in
degree as well as purpose and that rough proportionality prevents the
problem of "backing in." This Note concludes that the Court's deci-
sion in Dolan was correct because there is ample evidence to demon-
strate the constitutional necessity of the "rough proportionality" test.
34. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
35. For this part of the model, it is assumed that the mirror in question is a stan-
dard flat mirror and does not distort the reflection in any way.
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I. WHAT DOES "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" MEAN?
Before discussing the constitutional propriety of the "rough propor-
tionality" test, it is necessary to determine the test's precise require-
ments and the extent of the burden it places on a municipality. While
Dolan offers some guidance in addressing these issues, it does not ar-
ticulate precisely what level of scrutiny is required by "rough propor-
tionality." This part considers one of the state court standards
discussed in Dolan and reviews the application of the "rough propor-
tionality" test to the facts of that case to elucidate a clearer definition
of rough proportionality.
A. Review of State Court Cases Cited in Dolan
To determine the level of scrutiny required by the test, the state
standards examined by the Court in developing "rough proportional-
ity" must be reviewed.36 Virtually every state court, when faced with
a challenge related to development exactions, has required some sort
of relationship between the exaction and a harm identified with the
proposed development.3 7 The primary difference among the various
state court standards is the level of scrutiny given to reasons advanced
by a municipality in support of an exaction.38 The standards em-
ployed by the state courts can be grouped into three basic categories:
judicial deference (the lowest standard),39 the "specifically and
36. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318-20 (1994). Because no federal
case was on point, and claims challenging the constitutionality of development exac-
tions are generally tried at the state court level, the Court decided to rely upon state
court decisions for guidance. Id at 2318.
37. See, e.g., Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204
(N.H. 1977) (finding that landowners can only be forced to pay for improvements that
bear a rational nexus to a burden created by the proposed development); Jenad, Inc.
v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676 (N.Y. 1966) (stating that for condition to
be upheld development must create a need for municipal expenditures); Ayres v. City
Council, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1949) (holding that a condition precedent to a building
permit must be reasonably related to a need created by that development); see gener-
ally Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach, Please!": Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development
Exactions, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 823, 864-70 (1989) (analyzing the level of review employed
in state court exactions cases).
38. Compare Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30, 41 (N.J. 1975) (stating
that a subdivider should "be required to pay his appropriate and only his appropriate
share" of the burdens a development places on society) with Collis v. City of Bloom-
ington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (holding that "a reasonable relationship be-
tween the approval of the subdivision and the municipality's need for land is
required") and Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 675 (N.Y. 1966)
(explaining that underlying zoning plan of town is sufficient to justify exaction).
39. See, e.g., Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 675 (deferring to village law as a sufficient basis
for demanding an exaction); Billings Properties v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182,
185 (Mont. 1964) (stating that an act of the legislature is presumed to be valid).
1888 [Vol. 63
DOLAN v. TIGARD
uniquely attributable" test (the highest standard),' and the "reason-
able relationship" test (the intermediate standard).'
1. The Judicial Deference Test
Many states require only generalized statements regarding the con-
nection between the negative externalities of a proposed development
and a required exaction. To refute a takings claim in these jurisdic-
tions, a municipality need only state that the exaction does or could
alleviate the harm of the proposed development.4 2 This standard
leaves little room for judicial review of exactions and places a heavy
burden on the landowner to prove that the municipality's reasons for
the exaction are meritless.
In one application of the judicial deference standard,4 3 the Supreme
Court of Montana upheld a statutory requirement that land must be
dedicated to the public for park and playground purposes as a condi-
tion precedent to approval of a subdivision plat.4 The court stated
the rule that applied in these cases: "An act of the legislature is pre-
sumed to be valid... [and] every intendment is in favor of upholding
its constitutionality. '4 The court also stated that enactments of the
legislature must be upheld if any rational basis exists for them46 and
that any required nexus would be supplied by the underlying zoning
plan of the municipality.47 This case demonstrates that in jurisdictions
following the deference standard, exactions will almost always survive
judicial review.
40. See, eg., Divan, 334 A.2d at 37-38 (stating that a developer can be required to
pay for a burden placed on society but only in proportion to that burden); Pioneer
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (MI. 1961)
(same).
41. See, e.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804
(Tex. 1984) (stating that use of police power to take land must be reviewed under a
fact-sensitive test of reasonableness); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137
N.W.2d 442,448 (Wis. 1965) (explaining that a required dedication of land is constitu-
tional if the evidence reasonably establishes that the municipality will need more land
for public services as a result of the development).
42. See Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 676 (adopting a rule that if a subdivision creates the
need for an exaction it is not unreasonable to charge the subdivider with providing
one).
43. Billings Properties v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 185 (Mont. 1964).
44. Id. at 184-87. A subdivision plat is defined as "[a] map of a... subdivision
showing the location and boundaries of individual parcels of land subdivided into
lots." Black's Law Dictionary 1151 (6th ed. 1990). By applying for a subdivision plat
a landowner is asking the town to rezone her land, usually from being zoned for one
residence into being zoned for multiple residences.
45. Billings, 394 P.2d at 185 (citing Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 207 P. 993, 999
(1922)).
46. See id (stating that a use of the permit power will only be condemned when its
invalidity is proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
47. See id at 189 (holding that zoning plan of municipality is sufficient to prove
that the town -is in fact alleviating a harm identified with development).
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2. The "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Test
Several state courts require a precise correlation between the re-
quested exaction and the harms that would result from development.
In jurisdictions following this standard, the exaction must be found
necessary to alleviate a harm that will be caused specifically by the
proposed development and is not attributable to development in gen-
eral.' The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test is the strictest
standard used by courts to review a municipality's regulation of land
use through its police power.
In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,49
the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test. The court struck down as unconstitutional a munic-
ipal zoning ordinance requiring a flat-percentage dedication of land in
return for permission to subdivide a plot.50 The court stated that a
developer of a subdivision may be required to assume only those costs
that are "'specifically and uniquely attributable' to his activity and
which would otherwise be cast upon the public."' 51 The court further
emphasized that an application for a subdivision plat should not afford
a municipality a "point of control" 52 from which it can solve al fore-
seeable problems facing the municipality. 53 Thus, the municipality is
limited to requiring only those exactions that are unquestionably nec-
essary to alleviate a harm caused by allowing development to proceed.
3. The "Reasonable Relationship" Test
Many state courts take an intermediate position in assessing the
constitutionality of development exactions. In jurisdictions following
this standard, the exaction must be shown to bear some "reasonable
relationship" to the negative externalities that will be created by the
proposed development. Courts will not defer to unfounded assertions
offered by a municipality to demonstrate why the exaction is neces-
sary to offset the harm. Rather, some showing is required to demon-
48. See J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (stating
that "[i]f traffic now is greater than before because of the subdivision, then the [land-
owner] can be required to contribute an [exaction]" as long as it is proportional to the
actual harm caused by the subdivision); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (IIl. 1961) ("[I]f the burden cast upon the subdi-
vider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the [required exac-
tion] is permissible.").
49. 176 N.E.2d 799 (11M. 1961).
50. I&L at 802-03.
51. IL at 801 (quoting Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230,233-34
(II. 1960)).
52. 1a& The idea of using a harm identified with development as a "point of con-
trol" is an interesting concept. The court is attempting to guard against the use of a
single harm identified with development as a basis to legitimize the unbridled use of
the police power by the municipality. See infra note 194 and part III.B for related
discussions.
53. Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 801.
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strate that the exaction is in fact reasonably necessary to offset an
identifiable harm that will result from permission to develop.5
In Simpson v. City of North Platte,55 the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska struck down a North Platte ordinance, 56 which required dedi-
cation of land to a land bank every time a landowner applied for a
permit to develop s 7 The municipality planned to use the land in the
land bank to widen streets in the future.58 The court stated that to
withstand judicial scrutiny, the nexus between the exaction and harm
must be rational. 9 The court further explained that "'[the nexus]
must be substantial, demonstrably clear... [and i]t must definitely
appear that the proposed action by the developer will either forthwith
or in the demonstrably immediate future [create a need for the exac-
tion].' "6 The primary concern of the Nebraska Supreme Court was
to ensure that the required exaction was indeed intended to alleviate
the harm of the proposed development and was not simply a method
used to avoid paying compensation when the municipality exercised
its power of eminent domain.61
The Nebraska court's interpretation of the intermediate level of re-
view is only one of many. The tests employed by courts adopting the
"reasonable relationship" standard vary somewhat as to their specific
requirements. 61 The intermediate standard encompasses the entire
range of review between rational basis63 and strict scrutiny.' All of
the state courts, however, at least require the municipality to demon-
strate an actual need for the exaction rather than allowing the munici-
pality to refer to the legitimacy of a town zoning ordinance as a basis
for demanding an exaction.65 All of these jurisdictions also stop short
of requiring a demonstration that the need for the exaction is "specifi-
54. See City of College Station v. "Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W2d 802, 807 (Tex.
1984) (stating that the court must consider whether there is a "reasonable connec-
tion" between harm and exaction when making its determination); Jordan v. Village
of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965) (holding that a required dedi-
cation of land in exchange for a permit should be upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power if evidence reasonably establishes that municipality will need additional
land for parks, schools, playgrounds, etc.).
55. 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980).
56. Id at 301.
57. Id. at 299-300.
58. Id.
59. Id at 301.
60. Id (quoting 181 Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 336 A.2d 501, 506 (NJ
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)).
61. Id.
62. Compare Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1949) (holding that a condi-
tion precedent to a building permit must be reasonably related to a need created by
that development) with Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447
(Wis. 1965) (finding that a standard of review just shy of strict scrutiny is proper).
63. See supra note 12.
64. See supra note 12.
65. See supra note 41.
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cally and uniquely attributable" to some harm identified with
development.66
B. The Meaning of "Rough Proportionality" as Stated in Dolan
In Dolan, the Court adopted the intermediate level of review em-
ployed by state courts as the standard that most closely approximates
the "federal constitutional norm."'67 Apart from denoting a level of
review between simple deference and strict scrutiny, however, the va-
rying state applications of the intermediate standard relied on by the
Dolan Court fail to explain exactly what the test requires. The Court
similarly failed to explain the specific requirements of its newly
adopted standard. The Dolan Court merely identified the test as one
of "rough proportionality" 68 and offered the rather general statement:
"No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required ded-
ication is related.., to the impact of the proposed development. 69
While the Court's description of the test offers some guidance, the
question remains: What must be shown to demonstrate that an exac-
tion is roughly proportional to the harm?
C. Dolan Decoded: A Realistic Interpretation of "Rough
Proportionality"
The "rough proportionality" test is best interpreted to require a
showing of linear proportionality7° between the exaction and the neg-
ative externality caused by the development. The only relaxation of
this requirement stems from the Court's realization that due to the
nature of the harms caused by development 7' and the difficulty in-
volved in estimating the true value of an exaction,72 demanding a pre-
cise proportionality between the two places an insurmountable
burden on municipalities. This interpretation of the "rough propor-
tionality" test finds support in a case the Court cited as representative
66. See, e.g., Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447 (adopting scaled down version of "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" test) (citing Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801 (IM. 1961)); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246
N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn. 1976) (adopting same standard as Jordan court).
67. 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
68. Id
69. Idi at 2319-20.
70. Linear proportionality means a showing that two intrinsic values are equal in
size. For a discussion of how the need for linear proportionality fits into the scheme
of the judicial review of development exactions, see supra pp. 1886-87.
71. Very often the harm to society can be something as abstract as increased con-
gestion or decreased sunlight. Placing an exact monetary value on these intangible
harms is extremely difficult.
72. For example, determining the precise value of an exaction of a strip of land
460 feet long by 15 feet wide (similar to the one in Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314) is an
extremely difficult task, due to the limited market for such an unusual parcel of land.
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of the intermediate standard and also through an examination of the
application of the test to the facts of Dolan.
1. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls and the Intermediate
Standard
The United States Supreme Court cited Jordan v. Village of Me-
nomonee Falls73 as representative of the intermediate standard.74 The
Jordan court applied a level of intermediate review that leaned more
closely towards strict scrutiny. In Jordan, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin stated: "We deem [the 'specifically and uniquely attributable'
test] to be an acceptable yardstick to be applied, provided the words
'specifically and uniquely attributable to [the developer's] activity' are
not so restrictively applied as to cast an unreasonable burden of proof
upon the municipality ....
The Jordan court's description of the reasonable relationship test
offers the greatest insight into exactly what level of review is required
under the "rough proportionality" test. According to the court in Jor-
dan, municipalities must show that any exaction required is necessary,
both in extent and degree, to offset a harm identified with the pro-
posed development.76 The court adopted a standard less demanding
than the "specifically and uniquely attributable" requirement because
it feared that too exacting a showing would prevent certain valid land-
use regulations from being passed.77 The court did not wish to inhibit
the municipality's ability to regulate land use in a valid manner simply
because the expense and difficulty of demonstrating a precise link be-
tween exaction and harm was too great an obstacle to overcome.78 By
requiring heightened scrutiny, the Jordan court intended to eliminate
only those exactions that demanded more than was necessary due to
legislative whim or caprice.79
73. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
74. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
75. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
76. See id. at 448. The court stated:
We conclude that a required dedication of land for school, park or recrea-
tional sites as a condition for approval of the subdivision plat should be up-
held as a valid exercise of police power if the evidence reasonably
establishes that the municipality will be required to provide more land for
schools, parks and playgrounds as a result of approval of the subdivision.
IL
This straightforward statement describes exactly what is required under the current
standard of review-an exaction can be demanded only in response to an actual harm
and only in proportion to that harm.
77. Id. at 447.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 447-48 (describing possible situations that would meet the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's standard of review and represent legitimate uses of the permit
power).
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The United States Supreme Court rejected the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" test based on the same concerns.80 It stated
that this standard would pose too great a burden on the municipality
and would be inconsistent with the Court's recognition of the impor-
tance of the police power.8l Instead the Court adopted a scaled-down
version of the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test like the one
adopted by the Jordan court. The Court termed the standard the
"rough proportionality" test.81
The Court stated that the exaction and the harm must be shown to
be proportional.8 3 That is, the level of exaction must be necessary in
degree to alleviate the level of harm associated with development.
The Court, however, emphasized that proportionality does not have
to be shown with mathematical precision.84 Rather, the intrinsic val-
ues of the harm and exaction must be demonstrated as roughly
equivalent to one another. This rough showing serves the dual pur-
pose of preventing legislative caprice while allowing a municipality to
regulate land use validly.
2. Application of the "Rough Proportionality" Test in Dolan
Further support for interpreting the "rough proportionality" test to
require a showing of linear proportionality, but without a dollar-for-
dollar link, can be garnered from the Court's application of the test to
the facts of Dolan.s5 The Court's first application of the test, which
resulted in a finding that a private greenway was not sufficiently re-
lated to any harm that the expansion of Mrs. Dolan's store would
cause,86 was actually not a true application of the "rough proportion-
ality" test. The Court determined that the greenway had no relation
to alleviating the excess water runoff, the harm identified with the de-
velopment.87 This in fact was an example of an application of the
80. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994).
81. Id at 2319 ("We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting
scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved.").
82. Id
83. Id at 2319-20.
84. Id at 2319.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
86. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320-22 (1994). The Dolan Court
stated:
But the city demanded more-it not only wanted petitioner not to build in
the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner's property along Fanno Creek
for its Greenway system. The city has never said why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control.
... It is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along peti-
tioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city's legitimate
interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek ....
Id. at 2320.
87. Id
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"nexus" test's and therefore was an invalid use of the police power
under Nollan.
The Dolan Court also assessed the validity of the bicycle path exac-
tion, and in doing so, properly applied the "rough proportionality"
test. The lower court had determined that the findings by LUBA19
were sufficient to demonstrate that the bicycle path could have the
effect of lessening traffic congestion.90 The Dolan Court, in applying
the "rough proportionality" test, disagreed with the lower court and
held that mere assertions9' and LUBA's use of hypothetical figures
were insufficient to demonstrate that the exaction was roughly pro-
portional to a harm identified with allowing Mrs. Dolan's develop-
ment to go forward.92 While the Court stopped short of stating that
only a showing of an exact correspondence between exaction and
harm would suffice, it nevertheless required the municipality to
demonstrate that the bicycle path exaction would actually reduce the
amount of traffic the development created.93 The exaction and harm
thus needed to be linked in a direct way, and this link needed to be
proven by more than self-serving conclusory statements.
3. Requirements of the "Rough Proportionality" Test
The "rough proportionality" test requires two showings. First, a
municipality must demonstrate that the harm it identifies as giving rise
to the need for an exaction is actually created by the development in
question. The municipality may not simply offer conclusory state-
ments that the type of development in question generally results in
such harms. Second, the exaction required must be shown to be nec-
essary to alleviate no more than the identified harm.
88. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987). The
"nexus" test requires that the exaction alleviate the same harm that the requirement
of a permit was meant to guard against in the first place. In Dolan, denying the per-
mit altogether would have the effect of minimizing the danger of flooding. See Dolan,
114 S. Ct at 2320. The same result also could have been achieved by increasing the
size of the floodplain running along Mrs. Dolan's property and requiring her to set
aside some of her property for that purpose. A greenway system that would allow
public access on Mrs. Dolan's land, however, is not necessary to minimize the risk of
flooding. It is the dedication of title to the land in this case, rather than the regulation
of its use, that resulted in the lack of a nexus. Therefore, because there was no nexus,
the "rough proportionality" test was not necessary.
89. LUBA is Oregon's Land Use Board of Appeals-the first place a landowner
may challenge a decision of an Oregon town planning board. Dolan v. City of ligard,
114 S. Ct. 2309, 2315 (1994).
90. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993).
91. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22. Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court of
Oregon explained that "[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system 'could
offse. some of the traffic demand' is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway
system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand." Dolan, 854 P.2d at 447
(Peterson, J., dissenting).
92. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
93. Id.
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The "rough proportionality" test is more closely aligned with a
"strict-scrutiny"9 4 standard than with a judicial deference or "rational-
basis"95 standard. Put simply, the Court requires that the landowner
must only compensate the public for the harms that the landowner
creates. The Court decided that exactions in excess of such compensa-
tion would run afoul of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.96
The "rough proportionality" test demands a tight fit between the
harm and exaction and is tempered only by the Court's understanding
of the difficulties inherent in estimating the value of the harm attribu-
table to one landowner in a municipality of thousands.
II. "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" IS A NECESSARY PART OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FOR DEVELOPMENT EXACrIONS
Three major arguments that weigh in favor of heightened scrutiny
for development exactions also demonstrate the constitutional neces-
sity of the "rough proportionality" test. First, some form of close scru-
tiny is required to ensure that municipalities are not achieving their
eminent domain goals through the abuse of their police powers. Sec-
ond, because of the concerns for simple fairness that underlie the Tak-
ings Clause, heightened scrutiny is required. Third, heightened
scrutiny ensures that municipalities do not overreach or abuse their
monopoly of power over land use. This part reviews these arguments
and demonstrates how they support the constitutional necessity of the
"rough proportionality" test.
A. Police Power v. The Power of Eminent Domain
For decades courts have struggled to define the reach of the police
power.97 Generally, the police power is understood to encompass
anything that affects the public's safety, health, and morals.98 It also
94. See supra note 12.
95. See supra note 12.
96. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20; see infra parts II.B, III.A (describing underlying
purpose of Fifth Amendment and limitations it places on use of permit power to take
land); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation
Clause, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853, 1859 (1995) (arguing that the purpose of Just Com-
pensation Clause is to guard individuals against majority tyranny).
97. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Concerning the definition and
scope of the police power, the Court stated:
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each
case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of
legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of government, pur-
poses neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional applica-
tion of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the
scope of the power and do not delimit it.
Id.
98. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
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includes the power to abate activity that is regarded as a public nui-
sance.9 Beyond this cursory definition, however, the line between sit-
uations that call for police power actions and those that require
compensation under eminent domain is difficult to discern. Propo-
nents of heightened scrutiny for development exactions argue that
courts must ensure that municipalities do not cross this line when they
invoke their permit power.
Courts are often faced with challenges to the use of the police
power to enact and enforce zoning laws.l °° Zoning laws, first declared
constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1926,101 are very rarely found
to go beyond the limits of the state's legitimate use of its police
power.102 The courts, however, are more skeptical of a municipality's
use of its permit power to physically take land, rather than to simply
regulate its use.103 The level of scrutiny proposed by courts and com-
mentators when the permit power is used to take land is more exact-
ing and demanding than the level of scrutiny previously given to
exercises of a municipality's use of the police power.1
The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan illustrates that a higher
level of scrutiny should be used by courts reviewing cases involving
the use of the police power to physically take land. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Scalia stated that the permit power may be used only
when it "'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests."'' 10 5
When the reason for the initial use of the permit power is removed,
the constitutional propriety of its use disappears and its purpose is
converted into something else."° For example, if the initial purpose
behind using the municipality's power was to achieve some public
benefit as opposed to alleviating a harm, then the power exercised
99. 1&
100. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1994) (challenging
City of Tigard's use of zoning plan to demand exactions); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (challenging validity of a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the
operation of brick yards); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 653 (1887) (challenging
validity of a Kansas statute prohibiting operation of brewery).
101. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
102. See Morosoff, supra note 37, at 861 (stating that courts frequently defer to
municipal judgment in deciding challenges to zoning plans).
103. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (stating that different standard applies when
decision by town requires owner to deed portion of land to town and does not simply
regulate land use); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
433 (1982) (holding that where actual physical invasion of private property results
there is a taking regardless of whether the action achieves an important public
benefit).
104. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316-20 (finding that in cases where land is taken
under the permit power, the standard of review to be followed is heightened scrutiny).
105. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,834 (1987) (quoting Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
106. Id at 837; see supra pp. 1886-87.
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would more closely resemble that of eminent domain. 1°7 Thus, the
Fifth Amendment would require that the landowner be compensated.
The enormous power of the state to control land use without having
to compensate landowners must not be used for "ends wholly alien to
the reasons for having local governments issue permits in the first
place: to prevent activities that are harmful to neighbors."' 08 The ex-
action demanded from a developer must be connected in some way
with a harm identified with development of the property.10 9 In the
absence of such a connection, the municipality is essentially "trying to
obtain an easement through gimmickry, which convert[s] a valid regu-
lation of land use into 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' "110 The ab-
sence of a nexus between the exaction and some harm, therefore,
leaves the municipality with no "constitutional mooring[ ],"" for the
use of its permit power.
Opponents of the heightened scrutiny of development exactions ar-
gue that the determination of whether this connection exists is prop-
erly left to the municipality." 2 They claim that the courts are in no
position to determine whether a town is abating a harm or seizing
property for some public purpose. 13 They argue that the standard of
review used in exaction cases should be no different than the standard
used in any other case in which the court determines whether or not a
legitimate state objective is being advanced.1 4
The courts, however, need not always defer to legislative pro-
nouncements in regard to the validity of uses of the police power." 5
107. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("The purpose then becomes... the obtaining of
an easement... but without payment of compensation.").
108. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
11-12, Dolan (No. 93-518) [hereinafter Institute for Justice Brief].
109. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
110. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v.
Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
111. Il (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
112. See id. at 2329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("One can only hope [that the
Court's opinion today does] ... not signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative
power the Court exercised during the Lochner era."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954). The Court stated:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spo-
ken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In
such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the pub-
lic needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating
* or the states legislating concerning local affairs.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 n.1 (1987) (stating
that debatable questions as to reasonableness of exactions are not for the courts but
for the legislature to determine).
114. See id at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The State's exercise of its police
power for [exactions purposes] deserves no less deference than any other measure
designed to further the welfare of state citizens.").
115. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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In one of the earliest challenges to the use of the police power," 6 the
Supreme Court stated that a municipality's determination as to what
is a proper exercise of the police power is not final or conclusive but is
always subject to review by the courts.1 7 This is especially true when
a municipality uses its permit power in a way that places the munici-
pality in danger of violating the Fifth Amendment." 8
Courts are charged with the duty to ensure that the police power is
not used to achieve what should rightfully be accomplished through
eminent domain and just compensation." 9 Courts need to be, and
are, concerned with the problem of "taking by subterfuge."'1 Simple
deference to a legislative pronouncement that a plan is indeed a legiti-
mate use of the police power, when that legislative body stands to
profit from the plan, will do little to protect a landowner's Fifth
Amendment rights.121 Heightened scrutiny is thus a result of the judi-
ciary's insistence that the purported reasons for an exaction are suffi-
ciently clear and credible to counteract any suspicion of
impropriety. 2 The dangers to private citizens' Fifth Amendment
rights are so grave in exaction schemes that only through heightened
scrutiny can courts maintain constitutional guarantees while allowing
proper exactions to proceedY'
The test established by the Supreme Court in Nollan was the first
step toward establishing a proper level of heightened scrutiny to be
used in development exactions cases. The test requires showing a
nexus between the exaction required in exchange for permission to
develop and the harm to be occasioned by permitting development to
go forward." Under the "nexus" test, a municipality's exercise of its
police power is warranted only when this nexus is demonstrated.'2 s
While the "nexus" test is sufficient to guard against certain dangers
posed by development exactions, the "rough proportionality" test pre-
vents a municipality from using its police powers unconstitutionally in
a second way. A municipality may be able to demonstrate that an
116. Id. at 133.
117. Id. at 137.
118. See supra note 103 (giving examples of cases applying different standard of
review in cases involving the use of the permit power to take land).
119. See U.S. Const. Amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
120. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1612 (1988) [herein-
after Takings].
121. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 22 ("[N]o court should accept
the naked assertions of the City .... The City has every incentive to overstate the
public benefit and understate the private costs.").
122. Takings, supra note 120, at 1612.
123. See Morosoff, supra note 37, at 861-63 (stating that the use of heightened scru-
tiny "is the only way courts can protect landowners from overbearing municipal exac-
tions plans" and "ferret[ ] out those municipal exactions schemes, and only those
schemes, that are rightly eradicated").
124. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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exaction alleviates the harm against which the initial prohibition of
development was meant to guard. A municipality, however, can still
demand far more than it needs to alleviate that harm. For example,
the Nollan Court stated that an exaction for a viewing site on Mr.
Nollan's land would have satisfied the "nexus" requirement. 126 With
no further review of the exaction, however, the municipality quite
possibly could have demanded ten or twenty percent of Mr. Nollan's
land to accomplish this. The municipality would be able to alleviate
the suggested harm and satisfy the "nexus" test, but still use its police
power as a means of extortion to take land unnecessary to alleviate a
harm with no corresponding requirement of compensation. 27
Once a nexus is shown, however, if courts require the municipality
to demonstrate that it is taking only the minimum amount necessary
to alleviate the harm, then the use of exaction schemes as a method of
bypassing the compensation requirement can be curtailed. The
"rough proportionality" test enables courts to stop abuses of the po-
lice power that result not only from a lack of a causal nexus, but also
from a relationship in degree. Using the "rough proportionality" test,
courts can effectively distinguish between valid uses of the police
power and uses that more closely resemble the power of eminent do-
main, which requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
B. Simple Fairness and Reasonableness
The second major argument offered in support of the heightened
scrutiny of development exactions is based on the notion that the
state's vast powers must be constrained by limits of reason and fair-
ness.12 8 The Just Compensation Clause requires that the police
power, one of the state's most invasive powers, be used in a reason-
able manner because if it is not, it can lead to serious infringements of
the private rights of citizens.' 9 The argument posits that municipali-
ties will not always act to uphold the requirement of reasonableness if
126. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
127. The Court in Nollan stated that a viewing spot on Mr. Nollan's land would
have had a sufficient nexus with the harm identified with allowing development to go
forward, namely, impeded visual access to the ocean. Id. at 836. If the Commission
still wished to accomplish its true goal of obtaining a lateral beachfront easement
across Mr. Nollan's land, however, they could have demanded a viewing spot five feet
wide and running the entire width of the property. Therefore, the Commission would
have been able to accomplish its initial and improper goal despite the nexus require-
ment. While this example may be a bit extreme, it nevertheless illustrates how a
nexus requirement alone may be insufficient to guard against abuses of the permit
power.
128. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 3 ("A power so vast cannot be
exercised with impunity, but must be subject to constraints of fair dealing."); see also
Takings, supra note 120, at 1611-12 (arguing that the Supreme Court is concerned
with a state using its police power to improperly take property through a transparent
"subterfuge").
129. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 16-21 (arguing that if not used
reasonably the permit power can lead to excessive and abusive forms of regulation).
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their exaction schemes are given no more than deference by a review-
ing court. 30 This argument stems from fears similar to those underly-
ing the previous argument-judicial deference to exactions schemes is
insufficient to uphold the requirement of reasonableness and thus pro-
tect the Fifth Amendment right against uncompensated takings.
The fundamental concern of the Takings Clause is "simple fair-
ness."'131 Simple fairness dictates that landowners must not be subject
to exactions that are wholly unrelated to the burdens and inconve-
niences that their conduct imposes on others.1 32 This fundamental
concept has become an oft-stated maxim in takings literature. 33 A
court's deference to superficial findings by the same municipal body
that proposed the exaction does little to ensure that a municipality
wields its vast powers fairly.13' Courts must carefully scrutinize the
reasons offered by municipalities to justify the use of the permit
power to take land, so that state power is used properly and landown-
ers are treated fairly.' 35
Advocates of heightened scrutiny also use the Takings Clause as a
constitutional basis for the heightened scrutiny of exactions in a sec-
ond way. The Fifth Amendment requires that a state's absolute power
130. See id. at 17 (explaining that only through heightened scrutiny can abuses of
the police power by a state be curbed).
131. Id. at 4. See generally William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale Li.
694,710-12 (1985) (explaining that Madison, the author of the Takings Clause, meant
it to have broad moral implications and believed it necessary to ensure that property
was never taken without indemnifying the owner).
132. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Institute for Justice
Brief, supra note 108, at 17 ("Only by tying the level of the exaction to the harm
caused by the private project... can these public abuses be curbed.").
133. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Eth-
ical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L Rev. 1165, 1171-72 (1967)
(arguing that the only true test for determining whether compensation is required is
fairness); E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 287, 293
(1986) ("The point is one of fairness: why shouldn't the public sometimes bear the
costs of progress when only one or two owners of property are about to be sacrificed
for the common good?").
134. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 22 (arguing that the city can-
not be trusted to delimit the use of its permit power when it has every incentive to
abuse it).
135. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). The Court
stated-
We are inclined to be particularly careful about [what constitutes a legiti-
mate state objective] where the actual conveyance of property is made a
condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is
heightened risk that the purpose [of the exaction] is avoidance of the com-
pensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.
Id-
See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 17. Professor Epstein states: "The
persistence and the power of government monopoly thus demand great scrutiny over
the exercise of government powers .... ." Id.
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to take property must be restrained by a requirement to pay for it.' 36
When a municipality uses its power to take private property, the pub-
lic must bear the cost of that taking. The compensation requirement
forces society to compare the value of the property taken against what
they are being required to pay for it. This cost/benefit analysis is re-
ferred to as the "critical compromise.' 1 37 The "critical compromise"
ensures that property is taken only when society views the taking as
worth the cost.138
If courts do not use heightened scrutiny, municipalities will simply
create reasons to justify taking private property without paying for it.
Society will no longer be forced to consider the cost of public service
projects because the landowner, and not society, will bear the cost.
The result is a complete undermining of the "critical compromise" in-
herent in the Takings Clause. This safeguard is such an important
limit on the use of the state's vast powers over land use that courts
must use some form of heightened scrutiny to ensure that the "com-
promise" is upheld.' 39
The "nexus" test helps maintain the "compromise" by assuring that
exactions required by a municipality are related to some identifiable
harm that will be caused by allowing development to go forward.140
In this way, courts ensure that landowners are treated fairly by not
being forced to pay to alleviate harms for which they are not responsi-
ble. But the "nexus" test only guarantees that landowners are treated
fairly by ensuring that no exaction is demanded unless the landowner
causes a harm. How is a court to ensure that landowners are still
treated fairly in cases where the harm created by development is iden-
tified and linked to an exaction, thereby satisfying the nexus require-
ment? Under the "nexus" test alone, municipalities can undermine
the concern for simple fairness inherent in the Takings Clause by tak-
ing more than is necessary from a landowner to alleviate the harm
identified with letting development proceed. The only limit placed on
the size of an exaction demanded by a municipality is the landowner's
136. See Takings, supra note 120, at 1611-12 (explaining that heightened scrutiny is
the Court's method of ensuring that an exaction scheme is not a covert attempt to
take land without having to pay compensation).
137. Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 5. Professor Epstein states:
[A]gressive use of the state's monopoly power allows the state to undermine
the critical compromise implicit in the state's eminent domain power. Under
our constitutional regime, the state is allowed to force a taking so as to pre-
vent private parties from holding out in ways that frustrate the assembly of
land for useful public projects. But by the same token, the state must pay
compensation to demonstrate that the public really believes that the project
it undertakes is worth the private sacrifice it imposes.
Id.
138. ML
139. IMt at 5-6, 21-29.
140. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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expected profit from developing the land.' The landowner will not
be treated fairly in all cases, because the required exaction may be
disproportionate to the harm she creates by developing her land.
The Just Compensation Clause dictates that the harm created by a
developer, and not her expected profit, must act as the limit to the
amount that a municipality can demand from the landowner under the
guise of the police power.142 The "rough proportionality" test enables
courts to uphold this requirement. Once a nexus is found, municipali-
ties must further demonstrate that the exaction demands no more
than is necessary to alleviate the harm caused by development. Re-
quiring a municipality to make this second showing protects landown-
ers not only from being forced to alleviate harms for which they are
not responsible, but also from being forced to share the profits they
can realize from developing their land with the entire municipality. 43
If the concern for simple fairness as a basis for heightened scrutiny is
to be adequately addressed, the "rough proportionality" test is a nec-
essary second step in the scrutiny of development exactions.
Additionally, the "rough proportionality" test allows the "critical
compromise" inherent in the Fifth Amendment to be upheld. As was
evidenced in the Dolan case, the City of Tigard was able to demand
enough property to build a greenway and bicycle path and still satisfy
the requirements of the "nexus" test.'" If the "rough proportional-
ity" test had not led to this exaction scheme being struck down, the
citizens of Tigard would have received the public projects for free.
They would never have been forced to weigh the value of the green-
way and bicycle path to society against the cost of obtaining the land
for those projects, because it would be Mrs. Dolan who was bearing
the cost. Thus, only through the dual requirements of a "nexus" and
"rough proportionality" can the "critical compromise" be upheld.
C. Prevention of Overreaching and Abuse
Advocates of heightened scrutiny argue that rigorous judicial re-
view guards against overreaching and the abuse of government
power.'4 5 The tension between the protection of private property and
141. See infra note 161 (providing example of method of a town using an exaction
scheme to make a profit).
142. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (arguing
that for an exaction to be valid it must serve to alleviate the same harm that the
permit requirement was meant to guard against in the first place); Institute for Justice
Brief, supra note 108, at 21-22 (arguing that exaction must always be linked to some
harm of a type that the municipality is entitled to prevent).
143. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 18 (explaining that the system
of exactions can cause unfair distributional outcomes and force private parties to
share their personal gains with the public).
144. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2320-21 (1994).
145. See, e.g., Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 16-21 (arguing that gov-
ernment power can lead to abuse and excessive regulation if left unchecked by the
courts).
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the government's preference for improving the public condition with-
out the burden of paying for it has led to a constant tug of war be-
tween the use of eminent domain and the police power.146 The latest
and most dangerous example of this conflict is the bundling of permits
with exactions.
One former Supreme Court Justice has stated: "In a free govern-
ment all other rights would become worthless if the government pos-
sessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every
citizen."' 47 The bundling of permits and exactions, if left unchecked,
could lead to the government possessing exactly this sort of power.148
Only by tying the level of the exaction to the harm caused by the
private project can these abuses be curbed. 14 9 If exactions are given
as much deference as zoning plans, 50 municipalities will acquire an
effective tool enabling them to expand the limits of their police power.
Exactions could be used to solve all types of problems unrelated to
the development at issue.' 5 ' Municipalities could pass overly restric-
tive zoning plans banning all types of development and then back off
from those plans only when they are granted exactions from develop-
ers.' 52 If schemes such as these are given little or no scrutiny by the
146. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312 (1994) (claiming that
exaction demanded represented use of municipality's power of eminent domain
rather than police power); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 830
(1987) (same); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980). In
relation to the struggle between the police power and eminent domain, the Nebraska
Supreme Court stated:
The distinction, therefore, which must be made between an appropriate ex-
ercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is
whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the
use to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse
for taking property simply because at that particular moment the landowner
is asking the city for some license or permit.
Id.
147. Joseph Story, Commentary on the Constitution of the United States 670
(1833).
148. Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 16-21.
149. Id at 17.
150. William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Ap-
proach to American Land Use Controls 182-86 (1985); Charles Siemon, Who Bears
the Cost?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1987, at 115, 123-26. Professor Siemon
argues that restraint on the part of courts has led to the "impotenc[e] of judicial re-
view" in the land use context. Id. at 126.
151. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 20 (explaining that "bundling
permits and exactions together create[s] dangerous incentives for public officials to
disregard the private costs of public projects").
152. Id at 20; see Takings, supra note 120, at 1611. Professor Michelman explains:
Let us imagine that California enacts a law simply declaring that no owner of
privately held beachfront shall forbid or impede lateral public passage along
a five-foot wide path bounded on the seaward side by mean high tide. The
Nollan Court's first premise was that under the per se doctrine of Loretto,
this, in effect, direct regulatory impressment of public easements on all pri-
vately held California littoral has to be a taking. Now imagine that the legis-
lature, anticipating this response, enacts instead a law barring all private
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courts, municipalities will have a huge incentive to overreach and
abuse their monopoly of power over land use. 3
Law and economics advocates offer a counter-argument. Econo-
mists argue that the swap of an exaction for a permit to develop is an
efficient transfer." 4 Each party has something to trade, and society as
a whole is better off when the trade occurs. 55 These economists argue
that exactions will never rise to the level of extortion, because devel-
opers are free to travel to other municipalities to build.' 6 The "com-
petition" among municipalities for the best development projects will
keep municipalities honest and restrict their ability to use the exaction
as a tool of abuse.157 Thus, these economists argue, courts have no
business giving judicial review reminiscent of the "Lochner-era s5 8 to
what are essentially business regulations and inhibiting efficient trans-
fers by second guessing municipalities.
In reality, permit-for-exaction bargaining may not lead to the net
societal gain economists envision, and in fact, through abuses, may
discourage development and result in a net loss.'59 Judicial deference
to exactions schemes permits too great an incentive for municipalities
to overreach when using their permit power. Although developers
looking for sites can ostensibly choose with which towns they bargain,
owners of California beachfront land from access to any public water supply
or other utility service, except on condition of the owner's having dedicated
a public easement of lateral passage across privately held dry sand.
Id Professor Michelman's hypothetical demonstrates how when left unchecked, a
municipality may be free to pass overly restrictive laws and back off from them only
when the municipality gets something it wants in return.
153. Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 20-21; Morosoff, supra note 37, at
858-63.
154. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 544 (1991) (arguing that
exactions represent rational decisions by municipalities attempting to maximize the
benefits their citizens will receive in return for harms they must endure); Fischel,
supra note 150, at 179-84 (presenting an economic analysis that allegedly demon-
strates that municipalities should be free to sell their land-use approval to developers
to increase the social benefits as well as the benefit to individual owners).
155. Been, supra note 154, at 544; Fischel, supra note 150, at 179-84.
156. See Been, supra note 154, at 509 ("The community must compete with otherjurisdictions if it wants to encourage development because a developer dissatisfied
with a community's exactions policy can take the project to another jurisdiction that
offers better terms.").
157. See id. at 506-11. Professor Been refers to the constraint on municipalities as
the "theory of competitive federalism." L at 506-07.
158. "Lochner-era" judicial intervention refers to the historic case of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its progeny, which represented a period of extreme
judicial activism. The Court, acting as sort of a superlegislative body, relied on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down approximately 200
economic regulations from 1905 until 1934. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional
Law 802 (2d ed. 1991).
159. See William A. Fschel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox.: Why is More Efficient
Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 865,883-86 (1991) (discussing
certain hidden costs involved in so-called efficient exaction-for-permit transfers and
how they affect society).
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landowners whose property is stuck in one municipality cannot.160
Thus, the theory of competition as a protection of private rights, at
least for many landowners, is a myth. Landowners trapped in a mu-
nicipality will invariably opt to develop their land to the extent that
their expected profits from developing still exceed the cost of the ex-
action.' 6 ' Landowners will be forced to bear burdens representative
not of the harm they create by developing but only of what a munici-
pality can demand without causing the landowner to forego develop-
ing.'62 Therefore, while it may not be the province of the courts to
second guess valid business decisions made by municipalities,' 63 it is
always proper for courts to protect the rights of individual citizens and
ensure that the specific guarantees of the Constitution are upheld.
Heightened scrutiny allows courts to locate those zoning schemes
that are rightly eradicated, while not affecting legitimate zoning
plans. 64 Courts are severely ill equipped to determine the validity of
zoning plans and therefore give great deference to the findings of the
legislatures that enacted them. 65 When a court sees a potential for
abuse stemming from a zoning plan, however, it must come up with a
160. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 16. Professor Epstein ex-
plains: "The government which has the permit power over real estate knows full well
that the owner of this property cannot exit the jurisdiction by picking up her land and
moving it somewhere else." IdM
161. This statement reflects what any rational person would do. Faced with the
option of making "nothing" or "something," the decision to take the "something" will
inevitably win out. To demonstrate this example of rational economic behavior in the
exaction context, consider the following hypothetical: X owns a one-acre plot of land.
The acre of land, if sold in its entirety, is worth $10,000. X wishes to subdivide the
land into four 100ft. x 100ft. plots and sell the plots separately to buyers wishing to
build homes. Separately, each plot is worth $5000. If X is allowed to subdivide his
land for separate homes and sell the plots, they are collectively worth $20,000 to him,
or twice what they were worth if sold as a one-acre lot. There is, however, one prob-
lem that X has to overcome-X needs a permit from the Town before he can subdi-
vide his land. The Town, realizing the profit X stands to make and quite aware of its
right to deny X's request for a permit, enters into negotiations with X. It stands to
reason that X will go ahead with his plan if an exaction is demanded that is worth
somewhere between $0 and $9999, because even with that cost X still stands to make
a profit. If the Town demands an exaction that costs X more than $10,000 (X's ex-
pected profit), however, then X will not go ahead with the plan. Realizing that X will
make a rational decision the Town decides to demand an exaction of some value less
than $10,000 in exchange for the permit to build. Because X cannot remove his land
from the Town he cannot choose the Town Board with which he would like to deal.
Thus, he will be stuck with accepting the Town's offer because the reduced profit he
will gain from accepting the deal ($10,000 less the cost of the exaction) is still greater
than not accepting the deal at all.
162. See example supra note 161. See Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at
25 (stating that an exaction "must be tied to the harm caused, and not to the [land-
owner's] anticipated profit from an expanded business").
163. See generally Stone, supra note 158, at 796-804 (discussing the vices of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lochner).
164. Takings, supra note 120, at 1611-12; Morosoff, supra note 37, at 860-63.
165. 1 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 3.14 (3d ed. 1986);
Morosoff, supra note 37, at 860.
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test that will force municipalities to make a clear and convincing dem-
onstration that use of their permit power is necessary.'" Heightened
scrutiny allows courts to protect landowners from overreaching with-
out delving into areas in which they have little or no expertise. 67
The tests the United States Court adopts as part of heightened scru-
tiny, however, must be designed so that courts can protect the basic
rights of individual landowners while still allowing a municipality to
control land use-a necessary function in modem day society prop-
erly left to municipalities. 16 By requiring a municipality to demon-
strate that an exaction required is roughly proportional to the harm
created, a municipality is unable to "profit"' 6  by demanding exac-
tions worth more than the cost required to alleviate the harm associ-
ated with development. Therefore, the police power is limited in a
necessary way, but a municipality's ability to use it to regulate land in
a valid manner is unaffected. The "rough proportionality" test
removes a municipality's incentive to overregulate to exact profits and
provides courts with the tool necessary to satisfy the public and them-
selves that overreaching uses of the police power are ferreted out and
prohibited.
III. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
NEcEssrrY OF "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY"
Two additional arguments add credence to the view that the rough
proportionality test is necessary despite the existence of a nexus.
While both of these arguments touch on concepts formerly raised by
courts or commentators, 70 neither has been carefully drawn out and
discussed.
166. See Takings, supra note 120, at 1611-12 (explaining that the Court's use of
heightened scrutiny in Nollan was due to an "insistence on being satisfied that the
claimed nexus was sufficiently apparent and credible to counteract suspicion of taking
by subterfuge"); Morosoff, supra note 37, at 861 ("In reality, the rational-nexus test is
the only way courts can protect landowners from overbearing municipal exactions
plans.").
167. Morosoff, supra note 37, at 862-63.
168. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2316 (1994) (reasserting the power
of state and local governments to engage in land-use planning).
169. A recurring concern expressed by proponents of heightened scrutiny of devel-
opment exactions is that exaction schemes must not be used as a means of extracting a
profit from landowners. Se4 eg., Institute for Justice Brief, supra note 108, at 25; see
supra note 161. If a municipality is able to demand more than is necessary to return
the public to the status quo that existed before harms were imposed on them by de-
velopment, the municipality is able to profit. That is, if the municipality demands
$10,000 to alleviate a harm worth $5000, the municipality has profited by $5000.
Profit is not now and never has been a valid reason or result of using the police
power. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (stating
permit power is properly used to protect public but loses its constitutional propriety if
it is used for something else).
170. See supra parts If.B, Il.A.
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A. A Broad Reading of the Text of the Takings Clause
Initially, the notion of just compensation for the public taking of
private property was not a part of the ideology upon which our gov-
ernment was founded.' 7 ' Our forefathers believed that the "state's
proper role consisted in large part of fostering virtue [and] of making
the individual unselfishly devote himself to the common good.' 172
Moreover, people had a general faith in the legislature to do the right
thing.173 The legislator possessed relatively little individual power and
people saw him as largely immune from the temptation to abuse the
authority to regulate land use. 174 These two beliefs made just com-
pensation unnecessary, because landowners, certain that their land
would be taken only when absolutely necessary for the public good,
were willing to make the sacrifice.T7
These beliefs did not withstand the test of time. The adoption of
takings clauses at the state level evidenced the growing rejection of
traditional republican ideology, a decline of faith in legislatures, and a
new concern for property rights. 17 6 This trend culminated in the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause, requiring just com-
pensation when private property is taken for a public purpose.
1 7 7
Madison, the author of the Takings Clause, intended for it have nar-
row legal consequences. 78 While the clause was meant to apply only
to actual physical seizures of land by the government 179 it also was
intended on a higher and more ideological level "to have broad moral
implications as a statement of national commitment to the preserva-
tion of property rights."' s0 Madison hoped that the Fifth Amendment
would symbolize the importance of private property rights in our sys-
tem of government and indicate the Nation's intent to honor them.''
While the original purpose of the Takings Clause was to compen-
sate landowners when their land was seized for public purposes, cer-
171. See Treanor, supra note 131, at 695-701.
172. Id. at 699.
173. See id. at 699-701 (discussing republican ideology and faith in legislatures).
174. Id. at 701.
175. Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Con-
stitution of Pennsylvania, in 10 The Writings of Benjamin Franklin 54, 59 (A. Smythe
ed. 1907). Franklin stated: "Private Property ... is a Creature of Society, and is
subject to the Calls of that Society... [its return to society is] to be considered.., the
Return of an obligation previously received, or the Payment of a just Debt." Id.
176. Treanor, supra note 131, at 701.
177. See id. at 708-13. (discussing Madison's views on the need for a compensation
clause in the Bill of Rights).
178. See Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in 12 James Madison,
The Papers of James Madison 197, 207 (1979). Madison's original version of the Tak-
ings Clause differed from the version Congress eventually sent to the states for ratifi-
cation and read: "No person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it
may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation." Id. at 201.
179. Treanor, supra note 131, at 711.
180. Id. at 708.
181. Id.
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tain more important and far reaching goals underlie it.l2 The clause
is meant to elevate the possession of private property to the level of a
liberty interest.183 The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[i]ndividual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights."'"
The underlying purpose of the Takings Clause, therefore, is to protect
the liberty interest in private property against government interfer-
ence.' 5 The Just Compensation Clause is the only clause in the
United States Constitution that specifically requires the government
to pay damages when it infringes upon an individual's constitutional
rights. As with the entire Bill of Rights, the Fifth Amendment and the
Takings Clause are meant to provide the ultimate protection of an
individual right against the tyranny and will of the majority.
The underlying goals of the Takings Clause are so important be-
cause "while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies,
the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the
new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the
field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it
should be otherwise."'" In Euclid v. Ambler, the Supreme Court re-
lied on this concept to find that zoning, a use of the police power not
previously envisioned, was nevertheless constitutional.187 This con-
cept must not only be applied in favor of municipalities, enabling
them to use their ability to regulate the use of land in new and chang-
ing, but must also be viewed as a limiting concept. Therefore, as the
presence and effect of zoning expands, regulating something as funda-
mental as the right to build, the reach of the Takings Clause must also
be reinterpreted so that its underlying purpose is still realized.
Relying on the underlying purpose of the Fifth Amendment thus
requires that the Takings Clause be interpreted to require that land
taken for anything except the abatement of a harm must be consid-
ered a use of the state's eminent domain power and require compen-
sation. The "nexus" test alone is not sufficient to enforce this
requirement. To truly protect the Fifth Amendment's commitment to
property rights, a municipality using its police power to take land must
show not only that the land is necessary to alleviate a harm but that no
more than necessary is taken. Once again, the "rough proportional-
ity" test is the tool required by the courts to enable them to effectuate
Fifth Amendment guarantees.
182. See supra part lI.B.
183. See Barros, supra note 96, at 1859 (arguing that courts should "interpret the
Just Compensation Clause in a manner that maximizes individual liberty").
184. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,505 (1993).
185. See Barros, supra note 96, at 1857 (arguing that "the moral implication of the
clause is clearly that it is wrong to promote the good of the majority to the detriment
of the minority").
186. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
187. Id. at 387-88.
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B. The Problem of "Backing In"
The "rough proportionality" test is necessary to prevent municipali-
ties from creating the same dangers to individual rights that were pres-
ent when no nexus was required.188 By simply backing an exaction
into a suitable harm, a municipality can satisfy the requirements of the
"nexus" test but still use its police power in an underhanded or uncon-
stitutional manner to avoid the need for compensation when land is
seized for eminent domain goals.
An example of this technique will help show what is meant by
"backing in." Using facts similar to those in the Dolan case,'89 assume
that a town board decides to build a bicycle path to enhance the qual-
ity of life in the town. The path would connect two parks and run
along a river. While the municipality already owns some of the land
needed for the path, several points along the proposed route are un-
developed and privately owned. Assuming that the bicycle path is
found to represent a suitable public purpose,19° use of eminent do-
main power appears warranted and proper. To acquire the land and
complete the bike path, the municipality should seize the land and
compensate the owners. But the municipality does not wish to ex-
haust its already overburdened treasury and instead decides on an al-
ternate plan. The town, knowing that the landowners will eventually
wish to develop their valuable waterfront property, decides to wait to
acquire the land until the owners request permits to develop. When
the permits are requested, the town requires exactions of property ad-
jacent to the river in return for the permits. Following this plan of
action, the town is confident that it can acquire most of the privately
owned lots without having to pay any compensation.
The municipality is aware that for its plan to work and withstand
any Nollan-style takings challenge,' 9' it must demonstrate a nexus be-
tween the required exaction (the land for the bike path) and some
harm occasioned by the development. The town steps back and views
188. For a discussion of the main reasons offered to demonstrate the necessity of
heightened scrutiny in development exaction cases, and the dangers that exaction
schemes pose to individual citizen's rights, see supra part II.
189. For the facts of the Dolan case see supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
190. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Or.
L. Rev. 203, 205, 209 (1978). Professor Berger states:
The precise meaning of the "public use" requirement has varied over time
and according to the type of taking involved. The conventional statement of
the historical case development holds that there are two basic opposing
views of the meaning of "public use": (1) that the term means advantage or
benefit to the public (the so-called broad view); and (2) that it means actual
use or right to use of the condemned property by the public (the so-called
narrow view).
Id. at 205 (footnote omitted).
191. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987); see Takings,
supra note 120, at 1611-12 (giving example of a municipality devising a method of
taking land and avoiding paying compensation despite the nexus requirement).
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the development in the abstract to ascertain the possible negative ex-
ternalities that will be caused by development. The town then picks
the harm most closely linked to the required exaction and uses that
harm to demonstrate a nexus.1' Using the police power to take land
by backing a project into a suitable and available harm to satisfy the
"nexus" requirement, the town can first decide what public service
project it wishes to achieve, then avoid compensating landowners for
their contributions to the project. By "backing in," the town with-
stands the heightened scrutiny of the courts, but nevertheless creates
the same dangers that heightened scrutiny was meant to prevent. 193
The identification of a harm that a proposed exaction will alleviate
establishes a nexus, but this nexus cannot function as an "anchor"'"
to legitimize the use of police power to seize land for some unrelated
public service goal. The problem of "backing in" is magnified by the
fact that in today's society, most of the harms resulting from develop-
ment are not "common law nuisances,"' 9 s but simply inconsistent uses
of land termed harms by the legislature.' 96 Therefore, it is easy for a
municipality to create overbroad zoning laws and increase the harms
associated with development. Such overbroad regulations create nu-
merous harms to which any exaction can be linked to establish a
nexus. Thus, the process of establishing a nexus and defeating a tak-
ings challenge is accomplished without difficulty.
The "rough proportionality" test alleviates this problem. Munici-
palities are no longer able to use a single harm associated with devel-
192. The facts of the Dolan case offer a good example of this technique. See supra
text accompanying notes 20-28. The City of Tigard first decided that it wanted a
greenway system and a bicycle path. Then, as permits were requested, Tigard identi-
fied harms that might be caused by the proposed developments and, working back-
wards, used these harms to justify exactions for their pre-determined public projects.
Id
193. See supra part II for a discussion of the dangers that development exactions
pose.
194. The term "anchor" here refers to what has also been called a "point of con-
troL" See supra note 52. The basic idea behind this term is that a municipality must
not be able to use a harm identified with development as a hook to pull itself within
the realm of the police power. The identification of a single harm can not open the
door to unlimited use of the permit power, but rather must only be used as a measure
of how far a municipality must go to return things to the status quo.
195. Though there is no official definition of "common-law nuisance," it has gener-
ally come to be identified with the Latin phrase "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes,"
which, roughly translated, means that a person may not use their property in such a
way that it injures others. Black's Law Dictionary 1380 (6th ed. 1990). Essentially,
common law nuisances are those things that have historically been regarded as harm-
ful to society such as the noise and odor of cattle grazing. Spur Industries v. Del E.
Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
196. Over the past several decades, especially since the advent and proliferation of
zoning as a means of land-use control, what is considered a nuisance has changed
from the "sic utere" type to legislatively determined inconsistent uses of land. See
generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1960) (dis-
cussing nuisances that represent no more than inconsistent uses of land).
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opment as their "ace-in-the-hole" to demand a share of the
developer's profits. Once a nexus is established, the "rough propor-
tionality" test ensures that a municipality will only be able to demand
enough to alleviate the harm. Thus, if excess water runoff due to an
increase in impervious surface is the harm identified with develop-
ment, the municipality will be limited to demanding an exaction great
enough only to alleviate the specific amount of water runoff. The mu-
nicipality will not be able to decide first that it would like a greenway
and bicycle path and then use the problem of excess water runoff to
legitimize its use of the police power to take the property it needs for
these projects.
The "rough proportionality" test is necessary to remove the ability
to "back in" and to ensure that state power is not abused. By requir-
ing municipalities to demonstrate that exactions eliminate only the
harm created by the development and nothing more, municipalities
will not be able to use the "backing in" method to defeat valid takings
challenges.
CONCLUSION
The bundling of permits with development exactions creates several
grave dangers to the protection of private property that the Fifth
Amendment is meant to guarantee. To ensure that exactions are not
used as a means of taking land without compensating owners, courts
need to carefully scrutinize exactions and ensure that they are de-
manded only to alleviate some harm associated with the development.
The "nexus" test represents the first necessary step in heightened
scrutiny, but it is not enough. Municipalities must not only show that
exactions are necessary in purpose but also in degree. To ensure that
municipalities correctly apply their vast powers over land use and that
the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment are upheld, a showing of
"rough proportionality" between harm and exaction must also be
made.
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